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Making Waves: 
Circumventing Domestic Law on the High Seas 
Shannon Renton Wolf 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, a state's treatment of its own citizens was purely a 
domestic matter. However, with the development of international human 
rights law and after the horrific tragedies of World War II, the international 
community recognized a need to create standards to regulate the conduct of 
a state within its own territory and the treatment of its own citizens. 1 This 
area of the law has led to many questions concerning the extent to which 
limitations may be imposed on a state's power to control private conduct 
within its territorial boundaries. Although state sovereignty is a basic 
principle underlying international law, international human rights law 
proclaims certain fundamental and inalienable rights for every human 
being.2 Therefore, states have a duty to protect certain human rights of 
their citizens and the international community has a right and responsibility 
to protest if these rights are violated.3 
Numerous international and regional instruments, including Article 
16(1)( e) of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (Women's Convention), recognize rights 
concerning reproductive choice, such as the right to found a family, the 
right to decide the number and spacing of children, the right to family 
planning information and education, and the right to access family planning 
services.4 With regard to abortion, international instruments are largely 
• J.D. Candidate, May 2003, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A., 
2000, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. I wish to thank Professor Harry Prince for his 
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1. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 813 (3d ed. 1999). 
2. CORINNE A.A. PACKER, THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE: A STUDY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1996). 
3. Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 3, 3 (Hurst Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992). 
4. See PACKER, supra note 2, at 23-4l. 
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unhelpful.5 For instance, the Women's Convention provides little guidance 
in this area, largely because in order to achieve political consensus and 
accommodate a broad spectrum of cultures, the language of the family 
planning provisions was drafted in vague terms.6 Within international 
documents there is no explicit provision recognizing the right to abortion, 
yet there is no explicit denial of such a right.7 Therefore, international 
human rights texts create considerable uncertainty over whether the 
concept of the right to reproductive choice encompasses abortion.8 Some 
proponents of the right to abortion argue that such a right may be implied 
under other provisions that guarantee a right to privacy and a right to 
liberty.9 Therefore, a state may not interfere with a woman's decision 
concerning her pregnancy.IO In addition, some advocate a positive 
obligation on the state to provide access to abortion under provisions that 
guarantee a right to health, equality, and self-detennination. 11 On the other 
hand, arguments have been made that international law mandates a ban on 
abortion by extending right to life provisions to protect the unborn. 12 
Despite these interpretations, states have been left to detennine their own 
policies concerning this highly charged issue that implicates deeply held 
views regarding family, gender, and religion. 13 
Abortion laws around the world permit abortion for four reasons: "(1) a 
risk to the life of the mother, (2) for 'medical reasons', (3) for medical or 
social reasons, and (4) on request or on demand.,,14 Presently, Ireland falls 
into the first category. 
Abortion was criminalized in Ireland under section 58 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act of 1861. 15 However, in 1981 pro-life activists 
pushed for an amendment to the Constitution to prevent the judiciary from 
interpreting a right to abortion similar to the Roe v. Wade decision. 16 A 
referendum for the Eighth Amendment was held on September 7, 1983.17 
A two-to-one majority approved the amendment. IS The Eighth 
5. Id. at 72-73. 
6. Jd. at 73. 
7. Id. at 73-74. 
8. Id. at 73. 
9. JAMES KINGSTON & ANTHONY WHELAN, ABORTION AND THE LAW 79-80 (1997). 
10. Id. at 80. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 79. 
l3, Id. at 80. 
14. G. Diane Lee, Comment, Ireland's Constitutional Protection 0/ the Unborn: Is it in 
Danger?, 7 TULSA J. COMPo & INT'L L. 413, 438 (2000). 
15. Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861,24 & 25 Vict., c.I00, § 58 (U.K.) (remaining 
in force following Ireland's independence). 
16. Amy M. Buckley, The Primacy 0/ Democracy Over Natural Law in Irish Abortion 
Law: An Examination o/the C Case, 9 DUKEJ. COMPo & INT'L L. 275, 281-83 (1998). 
17. Rachel A. Yorke, Tiocfiadh Ar La: Ireland's Struggle With Abortion, 5 NEW ENG. 
INT'L& COMPo L. ANN. 83, 85 (1999). 
18. Carol Coulter, Turbulent History 0/ the Abortion Issue, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 16,2000, 
Winter 2003] MAKING WAVES III 
Amendment provides, "The State acknowledges the right to life of the 
unborn and, with due regard to the equal life of the mother, guarantees in 
its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and 
vindicate that right."l9 
However, almost ten years later, in Attorney General v. X (1992), the 
Irish Supreme Court held that abortion is legally permissible if the 
pregnancy presents a real and substantial threat to the mother's life,zo The 
facts giving rise to this case concerned a fourteen-year-old girl who was 
raped by her father's friend and wanted to travel to England for an 
abortion,zl The Court considered her suicidal mental state as a real and 
substantial risk to her health.22 All five justices recognized an 
unenumerated fundamental right to travel. 23 Yet three of the justices 
argued that such a right is subordinate to the right to life of the unborn if 
there is no real or substantial risk to the mother's health,z4 
In the wake of the X decision, a referendum was held on the abortion 
issue,zs The government presented three proposals: 1) guaranteeing the 
right to travel to other European Community states for abortions, 2) 
information regarding abortion would be freely available in Ireland, and 3) 
adding to article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution: "It shall be unlawful to 
terminate the life of the unborn unless such termination is necessary to save 
the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother where there is an illness 
or disorder of the mother giving rise to a real and substantive risk to her 
life, not being a risk of self-destruction.,,26 
The first two proposals reflected a reversal of the Irish government's 
position in Society for the Protection of the Unborn (S.P. U. C.) v. Open 
Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman Centre and s.P. u.C. v. Grogan, 
restricting the right to travel and right to information on abortion.27 
However, the purpose of the third proposal was to narrow the holding of 
the X case by rejecting suicide as a real and substantial risk to the health of 
the mother. 28 Irish voters approved the first two proposals, however the 
last proposal was rejected.29 Both of the approved proposals were 
incorporated into the Irish Constitution as Amendments Thirteen and 
Fourteen on December 3, 1992.30 
at 6. 
19. Art. 40.3.3, Constitution ofIreland, 1983; see also Yorke, supra note 17, at 85. 
20. Yorke, supra note 17, at 94-95. 
21. Id. at 93. 
22. Id. at 94. 
23. Id. at 95. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 




30. Art. 40.3.3, Constitution ofIreland, (1992); Yorke, supra note 17, at 96-97. 
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The liberalization of abortion law in Ireland may be attributed to the 
modernizing influence of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
European Court of Justice, which handed down decisions in Grogan (1991) 
and Open Door (1993) establishing that Ireland did not have broad 
discretion to restrict the right to travel or the right to freedom of 
information if the restnctIons violated European Union law.3l 
Furthermore, the X Case illustrates that in individual cases it is difficult for 
Ireland to maintain a policy of moral absolutism when faced with horrific 
facts. 32 In addition, increasing popular support in Ireland to expand 
abortion rights has provided an important impetus for change. A poll in 
March 2001 by Lansdowne Market Research indicated that 79% of the 
Irish people favor the availability of abortion in certain circumstances and 
62% believe that in these circumstances women should be able to receive 
abortion services in Ireland.33 
Despite progress in Irish abortion law, the issue remains hotly 
contested and is by no means settled. The reluctance of politicians to risk 
their jobs has impeded the development of much needed legislation.34 
Furthermore, the Medical Council's ethical guidelines are not in 
accordance with the X ruling.35 While the X case held that abortion is 
permitted if there is a real and substantial risk to the mother, the ethical 
guidelines prohibit abortion, except when it is a by-product of "standard 
medical treatment of the mother.,,36 Much confusion remains considering 
the "strange state of abortion law, suspended somewhere between the 19th 
century Offences Against the Person Act and the Supreme Court judgment 
in the X case, which the Oireachtas [the Irish Parliament] has failed to 
embody in legislation.,,37 
Although women are not able to request an abortion on demand in 
Ireland, the abortion law clearly establishes that Irish women may 
circumvent domestic law and travel to European Union states that offer 
legal abortion services. The most obvious option is to cross the Irish Sea 
31. Abigail-Mary E. W. Sterling, Note, The European Union and Abortion Tourism: 
Liberalizing Ireland's Abortion Law, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 385,406 (1997). 
32. Yorke, supra note 17, at 101. . . 
33. Kitty Holland & Frank McNally, Irish Should Not Have to Travel/or Abortion-Poll, 
IRISH TIMES, June 1,2001, at 5. The circumstances isolated in the poll included "when the 
woman's life is at risk by continuation of the pregnancy," rape or incest, where the 
pregnancy would cause irreparable damage to the health of the woman, when the woman 
was at risk of suicide, when the fetus had a disorder that was incompatable with life, when 
the woman believed that, for her, it was the right choice, and reasons such as family size, 
economic and social circumstances. Id. 16% of respondents said that abortion should not 
be available for any reason whatsoever. /d. 
34. Yorke, supra note 17, at 97. 
35. Coulter, supra note 18, at 6. 
36. /d. 
37. Fintan O'Toole, Abortion Hearings are Calm but no Consensus is in Sight, IRISH 
TIMES, May 6, 2000, at 8. 
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and go to a clinic in England. In 1999, it was reported that over 6,000 
women with Irish addresses had abortions in Britain.38 However, this 
number does not indicate the number of women who want to terminate 
their pregnancies but cannot afford to travel considering that a typical 
journey to England costs about $1,150.39 
In response, Dr. Rebecca Gomperts, a Dutch abortion doctor, came up 
with a rather radical idea to address the inaccessibility of abortion services 
in countries such as Ireland. Dr. Gomperts created a non-profit 
organization, Women on Waves,40 and raised funds in order to sail a Dutch-
registered ship to countries where abortion is either illegal or difficult to 
obtain. To circumvent domestic law she planned to perform abortions in 
international waters.41 Since abortion is legal in the Netherlands and the 
law of the flag state applies in international waters, the abortions would be 
lawful, according to Dr. Gomperts.42 
Dr. Gomperts' mission became a reality when she set sail on the 
Aurora and arrived in Dublin's port on June 15, 2001.43 However, when 
the Dutch Justice Minister Albert Korthals announced that the medical 
team had not obtained the correct license to conduct abortions, her plans 
collapsed.44 Instead, Gomperts and her team were only able to provide 
family planning advice, despite the estimated 250 women desperate for 
abortions.45 Although Dr. Gomperts was not able to carry through with her 
initial plans, she hopes to obtain more funds, complete the necessary 
paperwork, and return to Ireland.46 
The Women on Waves organization raises a host of issues involving 
international law, state sovereignty, the law of the sea, and human rights. 
Although there are a variety of substantive legal questions that follow in 
light of the European Human Rights Convention and European Union Law, 
this Note will focus primarily on whether Ireland even has legal authority 
to assert jurisdiction over Irish nationals or Dutch nationals aboard the 
"abortion ship." Part II of this Note will provide a legal background on the 
traditional bases of jurisdiction in international law, customary and 
conventional international law of the sea (focusing on the 1982 Law of the 
Sea Convention), and Irish law of the sea. Part III will analyze the 
potential arguments that Ireland may raise in asserting jurisdiction and the 
38. Frank McNally, Record Number of Irish Abortions in Britain, IRISH TIMES, June 7, 
2000, at 5. 
39. Sara Corbett, The Pro-Choice Extremist, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), 
at 22. 
40. Women on Waves, For a Safe and Legal Choice, at http://www.womeonwaves.org 
(last visited May 1,2003) .. 
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counter-arguments that may shield those on board the abortion ship from 
legal action. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Within international law, jurisdictional issues are usually distinguished 
between the jurisdiction to prescribe law and the jurisdiction to enforce 
law.47 Recently however, international law jurisdiction has been more 
narrowly defined to include a third category, jurisdiction to adjudicate, 
which is the authority of a state to subject persons or things to its judicial 
system.48 The jurisdictional issue discussed in this Note is whether Ireland 
has the jurisdiction to prescribe its laws, or whether Irish substantive law is 
applicable. 
A. INTERNATIONAL BASES OF JURISDICTION 
There are five customary principles of prescriptive jurisdiction within 
international law: 1) territorial principle, 2) nationality principle, 3) passive 
personality principle, 4) protective principle, and 5) universal theory.49 
The territorial principle recognizes exclusive jurisdiction to prescribe 
and enforce law regarding conduct that occurs within the state's borders. 5o 
Therefore, a state may assert jurisdiction over criminal conduct that occurs 
within the sovereign state's territory despite the nationality of the 
perpetrator. 5 I Consequently, aliens cannot escape jurisdiction except in 
instances in which there is some special immunity that does not subject the 
alien to local law, or the local law is not in conformity with international 
law.52 However, these are very limited exceptions.53 
Under the nationality principle, sovereign states have the authority to 
define the conduct of their own citizens and assert jurisdiction over 
nationals regardless of where the conduct occurred. 54 Similarly, the passive 
personality principle allows states to assume jurisdiction over offenses 
committed against victims who are nationals. 55 This theory of jurisdiction 
is based on the idea that states have an interest in punishing perpetrators of 
crimes against their citizens56 and protecting their citizens abroad.57 
47. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 710. 
48. !d. at 710-11. 
49. Id. at 712. 
50. Laura L. Roos, Stateless Vessels and the High Seas Narcotics Trade: United States 
Courts Deviate From International Principles of Jurisdiction, 9 MAR. LAW. 273, 275 
(1984). 
51. Id. at 276. 
52. J.O. STARKE, INTRODUCTlONTO INTERNATlONALLAW 209 (lOth ed. 1989). 
53. Id. at 210 (noting the exceptions from and restrictions upon territorial jurisdiction, 
including foreign states and heads of foreign states, diplomatic representatives and consuls, 
public ships of foreign states, armed forces of foreign states, and international institutions). 
54. Roos, supra note 50, at 276. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 276-77. 
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Therefore, under the passive personality principle a state may apply its 
laws against a foreign national for acts committed outside the state's 
territory against its citizens. 
The protective principle of jurisdiction focuses on the effect or 
potential effect of an offense and provides for jurisdiction over hannful 
conduct which has consequences of the utmost gravity for the state.58 
Conduct that threatens security, territorial integrity, and political 
independence of a state justifies asserting this type of jurisdiction.59 
However, this theory of jurisdiction has been criticized for potentially 
allowing states to judge subjectively what conduct is particularly hannful, 
and could, therefore, result in arbitrary decisionmaking.6o 
The universal theory of jurisdiction provides authority for a state to 
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over a perpetrator that commits a 
particularly heinous offense such as piracy, slave trafficking, war crimes, 
hijacking and sabotage of aircraft, genocide, and terrorism.61 Trafficking 
narcotic drugs is currently not recognized as a customary basis for asserting 
universal jurisdiction, however there are international agreements that 
provide for such jurisdiction. 62 
B. CUSTOMARY AND CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 
The two primary sources of international law of the sea are 
international customary law and treaties. Rules become customary law 
when: "(i) a particular usage is habitually observed by the generality of 
States; and (ii) they observe that usage out of a feeling of legal 
obligation.,,63 Treaties create legally binding obligations only for the 
parties who have ratified the treaty. However, a treaty may provide a 
model from which international customary law develops.64 
Prior to the twentieth century, international law of the sea consisted 
predominantly of customary law, which was largely based on the freedom 
of the seas, or rather that no single state or group of states could assert 
sovereignty over the seas.65 However, throughout history there has been a 
tension between preserving the freedom of navigation and recognizing 
territorial sovereignty.66 Specifically, coastal states became concerned with 
smuggling and anned attacks, and therefore wanted to exert some control 
57. STARKE, supra note 52, at 233. 
58. Roos, supra note 50, at 276. 
59. /d. 
60. STARKE, supra note 52, at 233-34. 
61. Roos, supra note 50, at 234. 
62. ld. 
63. 1 EDWARD DUNCAN BROWN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: INTRODUCTORY 
MANUAL 3 (1994). 
64. ld. 
65. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note I, at 928. 
66. ld. at 928-29. 
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over conduct in the waters adjacent to the coast. 67 The conflict between 
these competing interests has been exemplified in disagreements over the 
length of the territorial sea, which is the area of the adjacent water over 
which states can exercise sovereignty.68 
During the twentieth century, there qaye, been, several motivating 
factors encouraging codification of the law of the sea~ including the 
increasing depletion of fishery stocks and the threat of technological 
exploitation of the ocean.69 Finally, the United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea in 1958 led to the codification of a majority of the 
customary rules in four treaties: The Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the Convention 
on the High Seas, and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of 
Living Resources of the High Seas.70 These treaties are collectively 
referred to as the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea.71 However, 
at this conference the parties were unable to come to an agreement 
regarding the breadth of the territorial sea.72 
After an unsuccessful second conference, the third United Nations 
conference led to creation of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (LOSC).73 The LOSC largely superseded the Geneva 
Conventions and came into force in November 1994. Ireland signed the 
LOSC in 1982 and ratified the treaty on July 21, 1996.74 The Netherlands 
also signed the treaty on December 10, 1982, and ratified the LOSC on 
June 28, 1996.75 
One of the major successes of the LOS Convention, including an 
agreement on the maximum breadth of the territorial sea at twelve miles, is 
an outline of the zones of the sea and delineation of where coastal states 
and other states have various rights. 76 These zones include the internal 
waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic 
zone, the continental shelf, and the high seas.77 
67. Jd. at 929. 
68. Jd. 
69. Jd. 
70. 1 BROWN, supra note 63, at 3 
71. Jd. 
72. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 929. 
73. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 l.L.M. 1261; see also 1 
BROWN, supra note 61, at 3. 
74. CLNE R. SVMMONS, IRELAND AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 7 (2d ed. 2000). 
75. Hann M. Dotinga & Alfred H.A. Soons, The Netherlands and the Law of the Sea, in 
THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES 365, 367 (Tullio 
Treves ed., 1997); Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal 
Affairs, United Nations, Table of Ratifications/Accessions/Successions, at 
http://www.un.org/Depts /los/reference_files/status2002.pdf(last modified Feb. 27, 2002). 
76. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 930. 
77. For purposes of this Note, a discussion of the continental shelf, which is includes the 
sea-bed and sub-soil of submarine areas, is not relevant to the question of whether Ireland 
has jurisdiction over the Dutch abortion ship. 
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1. Internal Waters 
Under an absolutist view of sovereignty, states have authority to 
exercise jurisdiction over foreign vessels regarding activities that take place 
while the vessel is in port. 78 This is because ports are considered part of the 
internal waters, and internal waters are treated as if tney are part of the land 
of the state. Although the LOSC is silent on the issue of coastal state 
control over internal waters, such authority can be inferred from Article 
2(1) where internal waters are equated with land territory.79 Furthermore, 
the LOSC and the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention do not provide any 
limitations on the criminal or civil jurisdiction of a local state over foreign 
vessels in its port.80 
However, most states rarely exercise jurisdiction over a foreign vessel 
in port, and instead recognize the French modification rule.81 Under this 
rule, coastal states do not exercise jurisdiction over matters that are 
considered related purely to the "internal economy" of the foreign vessel. 82 
Instead, jurisdiction is only exercised when the activity in question affects 
the local state and threatens the peace of the port. 83 . 
2. Territorial Seas 
The sovereignty of a coastal state extends beyond its land territory and 
internal waters to the territorial sea. 84 The LOSC provides that states can 
claim a territorial sea of up to twelve nautical miles from their shores.85 
However, an exercise of sovereignty is "subject to this Convention and to 
other rules of internationallaw.,,86 
One major limitation on the exercise of sovereignty over ships in the 
territorial sea is the right of innocent passage to which· ships of all states are 
entitled to under the LOSC.87 Passage includes navigation for the purpose 
of calling at a portfacility.88 Although passage must be continuous and 
expeditious, stopping and anchoring are included within the definition of 
passage so long as it is incidental to ordinary navigation or necessary due to 
bad weather or some sort of distress. 89 
Article 19 includes a lengthy definition of the meaning of innocent 
78. Ted L. McDonnan, Port State En/orcement: A Comment on Article 218 o/the 1982 
Law o/the Sea Convention, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 305, 308 (1997). 
79. ld. 
80. ld. at 309. 
81. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 950. 
82. McDonnan, supra note 78, at 308. 
83. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 950. 
84. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at art. 2(1). 
85. ld. at art. 3. 
86. 1 d. at art. 2(3) 
87. ld. at art. 17. 
88. See id. at art. I8(I)(b). 
89. See id. at art. 18(2). 
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passage.90 The article states that, "[p]assage is innocent so long as it is not 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.,,91 The 
article lists numerous activities that are considered prejudicial.92 Although 
the LOSC allows for an extension of sovereignty up to twelve nautical 
miles from the baseline of the coast, the right of innocent passage greatly 
preserves the freedom of navigation by discouraging coastal state 
regulation over foreign vessels. 
The LOSC provides limitations over when a coastal state should assert 
jurisdiction over a foreign ship in territorial waters. Coastal states are not 
permitted to exercise criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship passing 
through the territorial sea with regard to any crime committed on board 
during its passage unless one of the exceptions are met, such as if the 
consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State or if the nature of the 
crime would disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the 
territorial sea.93 However, there is no limitation on asserting jurisdiction 
90. See Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at art. 19. 
91. Jd. at art. 19(1). 
92. Jd. at art. 19(2). The article states: 
Jd. 
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered prejudicial to the peace, good 
order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any 
of the following activities: 
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, or political independence of the coastal State, or in 
any other manner in violation of the principles of international 
law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting infonnation to the prejudice of the 
defence or security of the coastal State; 
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security 
of the coastal State; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military 
device; 
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person 
contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and 
regulations of the coastal State; 
(h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this 
Convention; 
(i) any fishing activities; 
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication 
or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State; 
(I) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. 
93. Jd. at art. 27(1). The article states: 
The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised on 
board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or 
to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed on 
board the ship during its passage, save only in the following cases: 
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; 
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or 
Winter 2003] MAKING W AYES 119 
over foreign ships navigating through the territorial sea after leaving 
internal waters.94 The article's purpose is to protect the traditional right of 
innocent passage to the greatest extent possible, and the primacy of the 
flag-state under which the ship is registered to exercise jurisdiction for 
crimes committed on board a ship. 
There are also limitations on the exercise of civil jurisdiction over 
foreign ships. The coastal state cannot stop or divert a foreign ship from 
passing through the territorial sea for purposes of exercising civil 
jurisdiction.95 In addition, the coastal state cannot arrest the ship for civil 
proceedings, unless the ship itself incurs liabilities.96 Similar to an exercise 
of criminal jurisdiction, there are no limitations on the right of a coastal 
state to arrest a foreign ship in territorial waters after it has left internal 
waters.97 
3. Contiguous Zone 
The LOSC also recognizes a contiguous zone, which includes the 
waters contiguous to the territorial sea. States may not extend the 
contiguous zone beyond twenty-four nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.98 States can exercise 
control necessary within the contiguous zone to prevent and punish "the 
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and 
regulations within its territory or territorial sea.,,99 In effect, this provision 
permits states to extend their jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea limit of 
twelve miles with respect to certain prescribed areas of the law that are 
breached within their territory or territorial sea. There is also a more 
expansive view that states have jurisdiction over violations that occur 
within the contiguous zone if the foreign vessel is about to enter or just left 
the territorial sea. 100 
4. Exclusive Economic Zone 
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) includes the area beyond the 
territorial sea: States can claim an EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles from 
Id. 
the good order of the territorial sea; 
(c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by 
the master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular 
officer of the flag State; or 
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 
94. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at art. 27(2). 
95. Id. at art. 28(1). 
96. Id. at art. 28(2). 
97. Id. at art. 28(3). 
98. Id. at art. 33(2). 
99. Id. at art. 33(1). 
100. D.G. Stephens, The Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention on the Conduct of 
Peacetime Naval/Military Operations, 29 CAL. W.INT'LLJ. 283,290 (1999). 
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the baselines from where the length of the territorial sea is measured. 101 
The LOSC grants rights to exercise jurisdiction with respect to: "(i) the 
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, (ii) 
marine scientific research, and (iii) the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment.,,102 
In addition, all states are entitled to the same rights in the EEZ as 
provided in the high seas relating to the freedom of navigation, overflight, 
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other purposes that are 
compatible with the EEZ provisions of the Convention.103 Limitations on 
the assertion of jurisdiction on the high seas are also applicable to the EEZ 
unless they are incompatible with other provisions of the LOSC. 104 
5. High Seas 
The high seas constitutes "all parts of the seas that are not included in 
the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial seas or in the internal waters 
of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.,,105 The 
LOSC codifies the customary rule that the high seas are open to all States 
and lists the various freedoms that are included. 106 Furthermore, the high 
seas are "reserved for peaceful purposes" and no state may claim any part 
of the high seas subject to its sovereignty. 107 
The LOSC also includes the customary rule that ships on the high seas 
are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state under which the 
ship is registered. 108 However, there are exceptions expressly provided for 
in international treaties or under the LOSC, which include ships engaged in 
s lave transportation, piracy, and unauthorized broadcasting. I 09 
101. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at arts. 55, 57. 
102. /d. at art. 56(1 )(b). 
103. /d. at art. 58(1). 
104. /d. at art. 58(2). 
105. /d. at art. 86. 
106. !d. at art. 87(1). The article states: 
/d. 
The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. 
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this 
Convention imd by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, 
both for coastal and land-locked States: 
(a) freedom of navigation; 
(b) freedom of overflight; 
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; 
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations 
permitted under intemationallaw, subject to Part VI; 
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down m 
section 2; 
(t) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII. 
107. Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, supra note 73, at arts. 88, 89. 
108. !d. at art. 92. 
109. /d. at arts. 99-100, 109. 
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C. IRELAND AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 
As an island state with a long coastline and an extensive continental 
shelf, Ireland maintains tremendous interest in the international law of the 
sea and its development. In fact, Irish dry land only makes up 10% of its 
offshore zones. IIO Although Ireland has a small ocean-going merchant fleet 
and navy, the country has substantial interest in fishery resources. I I I 
Consequently, Ireland has participated in all three of the U.N. 
Conferences on the Law of the Sea. Although Ireland signed the Geneva 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea, Ireland never ratified the 
Conventions. I 12 It appears that the Convention on Conservation of Living 
Resources on the High Seas was considered for ratification, however it was 
determined that it contained provisions which might be interpreted to 
prevent Ireland from establishing an exclusive fishery zone beyond its 
territorial seas. 113 Regarding the other three conventions, one commentator 
has suggested that non-ratification was "due to lethargy rather than 
objections in principle" since Ireland's maritime legislation, the Maritime 
Jurisdiction Act of 1959 (MJA), contains provisions that are identical or 
very similar to the Convention on the Territorial Sea. 114 
1. Internal Waters and Territorial Sea 
The MJA originally provided for a three-mile territorial sea limit. 115 
However, the MJA was amended in 1987 to claim the maximum twelve 
nautical miles under the LOSC. 116 This amendment came into force on 
September 1, 1988.117 
The right of innocent passage is only mentioned once in the MJA in 
relation to internal waters formerly considered part of the territorial seas or 
high sea areas enclosed by straight baselines, e.g. bays.118 Although the 
MJA does not interpret the right of innocent passage, official statements at 
the UNCLOS III demonstrate that Ireland was against a restrictive 
definition of innocent passage. ll9 
Offenses committed within Irish internal waters or territorial waters by 
means of or on board a foreign ship are subject to Irish criminal 
jurisdiction. l20 However, in order to prosecute an alien for an offense 
committed in territorial waters on board 'a foreign ship, a certification from 
110. SYMMONS, supra note 74, at I. 
111. ld. at 2, 
112. ld. at 3. 
113. ld. 
114, ld. at 4, 
115. Maritime Jurisdiction Act, § 3 (1959). 
116. SYMMONS, supra note 74, at 76. 
117. ld. at 76 n.64. 
118. See Maritime Jurisdiction Act, § 5 (1959). 
119. SYMMONS, supra note 74, at 85. 
120. Maritime Jurisdiction Act, § 10 (1959). 
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the Minister of External Affairs is required before proceedings can be 
instituted. 121 Clearly, this provision provides safeguards for aliens, 
however only with regard to offenses committed in the territorial seas. 122 
No such certificate is required for offenses committed by aliens in internal 
waters. 123 
The interesting question is whether Ireland has adopted the "peace of 
the port" principle. Major seafaring nations such as the United Kingdom, 
France, and the United States apply this doctrine. 124 This author was 
unable to find any Irish case law that establishes an adherence or rejection 
of this principle or that addresses the extent to which Ireland asserts port 
state jurisdiction over foreign vessels. However, it may be inferred that 
Ireland would follow English case law, which clearly recognizes that host 
states should not exercise authority over a foreign vessel in port, unless the 
conduct has sufficiently affected the port state's interests. 125 
2. Contiguous Zone 
Although the LOSC permits states to claim a contiguous zone of up to 
an additional twelve miles from the edge of the territorial sea, Ireland does 
not claim a contiguous zone separate from the breadth of the territorial sea, 
nor is there any mention of such a zone in the MJA. 126 No coastal state is 
obligated to claim this zone since the LOSC uses permissive language. 127 
At present, Ireland only exercises jurisdiction over the territorial sea of 
twelve miles. Therefore, regulation of Ireland's custom, fiscal, 
immigration, and sanitary laws does not extend beyond the territorial sea. 
3. Exclusive Economic Zone 
The MJA recognizes a separate exclusive fishery zone, however there 
is no mention of an exclusive economic zone.l2S Although in 1976 Ireland 
established a 200-mile exclusive fishery zone (EFZ) in a statutory order -
the Maritime Jurisdiction (Exclusive Fisher Limits) Order - Ireland has not 
claimed a 200-mile exclusive economic zone.129 Therefore, there seems to 
be a jurisdictional gap outside the twelve-mile territorial limit over matters 
121. Id. § II. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. 
124. See Jason M. Schupp, The Clay Bill: Testing the Limits of Port State Sovereignty, 18 
MD. 1. [NT'L L. & TRADE 199, 207-08 (1994) (Describing the "internal economy rule," 
which states, "port states will assume jurisdiction when, in their opinion, the peace or 
tranquility of the port is disturbed. "). 
125. !d. at 210. 
126. SVMMONS, supra note 74, at 125. 
127. Id. 
128. Maritime Jurisdiction Act, § 6 (1959). 
129. Clive R. Symmons, Ireland and the Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES, supra note 75, at 261,280. 
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that do no constitute a breach of fishery laws. 13o This is exemplified by the 
jurisdictional problems Irish authorities have had dealing with the 
intentional ramming of Irish fishing vessels by Spanish trawlers within the 
200-mile EFZ.131 
4. High Seas 
As an island state, Ireland views freedom on the high seas as a 
fundamental principle of international law that ensures freedom of 
navigation between countries. In practice, Ireland has consistently 
followed the principle that jurisdiction on the high seas belongs to the 
foreign vessel's flag state. 132 
III. ANALYSIS 
Principles of international jurisdiction, international law of the sea, and 
Irish law of the sea help clarify the potential arguments for and against Irish 
jurisdictional authority over either Dutch or Irish nationals during various 
stages of the abortion ship's travel. 
A. JURISDiCTiON PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF THE ABORTlON SHIP 
Before the arrival of the abortion ship, Ireland clearly has no 
jurisdictional authority over the Dutch ship while it is on the high seas. 
The LOSe and Irish practice have shown the utmost respect for the 
freedom of navigation on the high seas. At this point, since Dutch 
nationals aboard the ship have not engaged in any activity that might put 
them within the jurisdiction of Ireland, the Netherlands retains exclusive 
jurisdiction. This holds true when the ship enters within the 200-mile zone, 
since Ireland only claims an exclusive fishery zone, which is unrelated to 
the activities aboard an abortion ship. Even if Ireland claimed an EEZ, the 
abortion ship's activity does not fall within the jurisdictional provisions of 
the LOSe. Furthennore, since Ireland does not claim a contiguous zone, 
the abortion ship is still effectively outside the jurisdictional purview of 
Ireland beyond the twelve-mile territorial sea. 
However, when the boat enters the twelve-mile territorial limit, it has 
essentially entered the sovereign territory of Ireland, as recognized under 
the LOSe and Irish law. Yet, the LOSe explicitly provides for the right of 
innocent passage, thus limiting a state's ability to exclude foreign vessels 
from territorial waters. Therefore, the relevant issue is whether the ship's 
passage qualifies as innocent. 
Under the LOSe, "Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to 
the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.,,133 The enumeration 
130. /d. at 282. 
131. fd. 
132. /d. at 294. 
133. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at art. 19(1). 
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of prejudicial activities seems to make "innocence" dependent on the 
conduct that occurs during passage. 134 In effect, this prevents Ireland from 
determining the non-innocence of passage by the character of the ship. 
Ireland may argue that although the conduct of the Dutch abortion ship is 
lawful, the purpose of the passage to perform abortions on Irish nationals 
makes the transit non-innocent. Although Ireland views the passage of the 
Dutch ship as morally corrupt, and therefore non-innocent, Article 19(2) 
has been interpreted as an exhaustive list of activities that are non-
innocent. 135 Since the Dutch nationals have not conducted any activities 
that are listed, they are effectively passing through territorial waters in 
accordance with the LOSC. 
Essentially Ireland has no means to prevent the passage of the abortion 
ship because it has not engaged in any of the proscribed non-innocent 
activities. Hence, Ireland may not impede the ship's transit through 
territorial waters. Furthermore, since no illegal activity has occurred 
during the ship's passage, Ireland cannot assert jurisdiction over the Dutch 
nationals. 
B. JURISDICTION OVER THE ABORTION SHIP IN PORT 
Once the abortion ship arrives in port, Irish jurisdictional authority is at 
its greatest since Ireland has both prescriptive and enforc.ement jurisdiction. 
Women on Waves listed counseling, pregnancy testing, and workshops on 
reproductive health as activities to be conducted while in port. 136 The 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Irish Constitution provides that the Eighth 
Amendment, protecting the life of the unborn, "shall not limit the freedom 
to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may 
be established by law, information relating to services lawfully available in 
another state.,,137 In March 1995, the Abortion Information Act was passed 
which limits the right to receive such information. The Act addresses how 
and under what circumstances publishers of abortion material and 
organizations rendering pregnancy counseling can provide information 
regarding abortion. 138 The Act specifically prohibits counselors from 
advocating or promoting abortions. 139 In addition, counselors are not 
permitted to make an appointment or any . other arrangements for an 
134. See id. at art. 19(2). 
135. Although the interpretation of Article 19(2) as an exhaustive list was included in only 
a bilateral agreement between the United States and Soviet Union, it clarifies the concept of 
innocent passage for the rest of the international community. Lieutenant Commander John 
W. Rolph, Freedom of Navigation and the Black Sea Bumping Incident: How "Innocent" 
Must Innocent Passage Be?, 135 MIL. L. REv. 137, 163 (1992). 
136. Women on Waves, Activities, at hrtp://www.womeonwaves.org/e/e_activities.html 
(last visited May 1,2003). 
137. Art. 40.3.3, Constitution ofIreland, 1983. 
138. Keith S. Kogler, Ire/and's Abortion Information Act of 1995, 29 VAND. 1. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1137 (1996). 
139. Id. at 1137-38. 
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abortion on behalf of a woman. 140 A violation of the Infonnation Act 
creates civil liability of up to £ I ,500. 141 
The Dutch pro-choice activists could be acting in violation of the 
Abortion Infonnation Act if counselors advocate the tennination of a 
pregnancy. Ireland can argue that the mere context of the counseling - on 
board a ship outfitted to perfonn abortions on the high seas - constitutes a 
promotion of pregnancy tennination. In addition, the Dutch nationals 
would also be in violation of the provision prohibiting counselors from 
arranging abortions since they are acting within dual roles as both 
counselors and abortion doctors. Thus, the Dutch nationals may be liable 
for violations of the Abortion Infonnation Act. 
However, it· is customary under international law to refrain from 
asserting jurisdiction over foreign vessels unless the activity disturbs the 
peace of the port.142 Historically port states have refrained from exercising 
jurisdiction in situations involving wages, collective bargaining, necessary 
discipline, and crimes committed on board. 143 Two cases that established 
this customary rule involved assaults committed by American seamen on 
American flag vessels, Newton and Sally, located in French ports. 144 
France declined to assert jurisdiction because the conduct was deemed 
insufficient to disturb the peace of the port. 145 Yet, in the Wildenhus case, 
the United States Supreme Court held that the murder of a Belgian 
crewman by another Belgian crewmember on board a Belgian flag vessel 
while in a U.S. port constituted activity that disturbs the peace. 146 The 
Court stated that: "If the thing done ... is of a character to affect those on 
shore or in the port when it becomes known, the fact that only those on the 
ship saw it when it was done is a matter of no moment.,,147 The Court also 
referred to the universal condemnation of murder as another justification 
for asserting jurisdiction. 148 
In the case of the abortion ship, providing infonnation advocating 
abortion does not rise to the same level as murder, although Irish pro-life 
forces would certainly argue to the contrary. Although such conduct may 
be morally condemned by Ireland, the activity in question is a violation 
only of civil law, not criminal law. Furthennore, advocating abortion is not 
conduct that is universally condemned. 
On the other hand, if the Dutch pro-choice activists' conduct incites 
sufficient public response, a strong argument could be made that Ireland 
140. Id. at 1138. 
141. /d. 
142. See discussion at supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. 
143. Schupp, supra note 124, at 208. 
144. /d. 
145. Id. at 208-09. 
146. Id. at 212-13. 
147. Wi1denhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 17 (1887). 
148. Id. at 17-18. 
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may assert jurisdiction. Surprisingly, when the Aurora arrived in the 
Dublin port there was no sign of protest. 149 When one journalist questioned 
a member of Youth Defense, one of Ireland's most militant anti-abortion 
organizations, he responded that Dr. Gomperts was "just pulling a pUblicity 
stunt."ISO Therefore, the ability of Ireland to assert jurisdiction over the 
foreign vessel rests to a considerable degree on the intensity of the public 
response. However, Ireland may argue that a potential disturbance of the 
peace is sufficient to justify asserting jurisdiction. Such an argument 
would be similar to the reasoning adopted in Wildenhus when the Court 
stated: 
It is not alone the publicity of the act, or the noise and clamor 
which attends it, that fixes the nature of the crime, but the act itself. 
If that is of a character to awaken public interest when it becomes 
known, it is a "disorder" the nature of which is to affect the 
community at large, and consequently to invoke the power of the 
local government whose people have been disturbed by what was 
done. lSI 
Another question raised is whether Ireland may enjoin its citizens from 
boarding the abortion ship. Clearly, Ireland has jurisdictional authority 
over its own citizens under both the territorial and nationality principles. 
However, Attorney General v. X established that there is a fundamental 
right to travel. IS2 In addition, the Thirteenth Amendment of the Irish 
Constitution recognizes the right of a woman to travel abroad to terminate 
her pregnancy. IS) Therefore, it is doubtful that Ireland would be successful 
in preventing Irish nationals from boarding the Aurora. 
C. JURISDICTION OVER THE ABORTION SHIP UPON LEA VJNO PORT 
After the abortion ship leaves port, the vessel remains under Irish 
jurisdiction twelve miles from the baseline. Normally under the LOSC a 
state should not assert civil jurisdiction over a vessel passing through the 
territorial waters unless there are liabilities incurred by the ship itself. 
However, there are no limitations on civil jurisdiction to levy execution or 
arrest of a foreign ship in the territorial seas after leaving internal waters. IS4 
Therefore, if Ireland finds a violation of the Abortion Information Act, and 
the ship has already left internal waters, Ireland may still assert jurisdiction 
within its territorial waters under international law. 
If the Dutch nationals attempted to or performed abortions within the 
149. Corbett, supra note 39, at 26. 
ISO. /d. 
151. Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. at 18. 
152. See discussion at supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
153. See discussion at supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text. 
154. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at art. 28. 
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territorial waters, Ireland could certainly assert criminal jurisdiction under 
Irish and international law. Irish law permits criminal jurisdiction within 
its territorial waters,155 and international law permits jurisdiction if the 
nature of the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State or if the 
nature of the crime would disturb the peace of the country or good order of 
the territorial sea. 156 Ireland would have a strong argument for asserting 
jurisdiction under either exception. First, Ireland may argue that abortion 
within the territorial seas has profound consequences for the Irish nation by 
diluting the authority of the government to legislate on social issues, 
depriving would-be fathers of children, and depriving the Irish unborn of 
the right to life under the Irish Constitution. These are just some of the 
arguments Ireland may advance. 
In addition, the performance of abortions off the coast of Ireland would 
most certainly disturb the peace of the country. Although Dr. Gomperts 
was met with few signs of protest, if she had actually performed abortions 
within Ireland's territorial waters, the proximity and the reality of the 
situation would most likely create significant public outcry. There was 
little protest upon Dr. Gomperts' arrival because many thought she was 
bluffing or just trying to stir up media attention. However, if her mission 
had done more than raise awareness, it is likely that pro-choice groups and 
religious organizations would have created a greater uproar. 
Furthermore, performance of abortions ·within territorial waters could 
arguably be considered non-innocent passage under subsection (I), which 
makes non-innocent "any other activity not having a direct bearing on 
passage.,,157 Although this provision is excessively vague, Ireland may 
assert that abortion operations do not have any direct relationship to 
navigation, and therefore passage is non-innocent. Therefore, Ireland could 
seize the vessel, thus preventing it from passing through territorial waters. 
D. JURISDICTION OVER THE ABORTION SHIP ON THE HIGH SEAS 
Beyond the twelve-mile territorial waters zone, the ship is not 
technically in the high seas according to the definition under the LOSC. 
The provisions regarding the high seas "apply to all parts of the sea that are 
not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the 
internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic 
State.,,158 Instead, the boat is located in the EFZ. Although technically 
performing abortions outside the twelve-mile zone is within the exclusive 
economic fishery zone, all of the freedoms afforded to the high seas are 
also granted to the EEZ. Since the Aurora would be outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of Ireland, the issue is whether Ireland may assert extra-
ISS. Maritime Jurisdiction Act, § 10 (1959). 
156. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at art. 27(1). 
157. Jd. at art. 19(2)(1). 
158. Jd. at art. 86. 
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territorial jurisdiction over a foreign vessel perfonning abortions in 
international waters. 
The LOSe only grants jurisdiction over a foreign vessel in the high 
seas in cases of slave trafficking, piracy, and unauthorized broadcasting. 
The only category under which the perfonnance of abortions could 
possibly fall under is piracy. Article 101 of the LOSe states: 
[Piracy includes] (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or act 
of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) 
on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons 
or property on board such ship or aircraft .... ,,159 
There are several problems with Ireland asserting universal jurisdiction 
over the abortion ship. First, the definition of piracy only includes illegal 
acts of violence against another ship, and such persons or property on 
board such ship. However, it has been suggested that since facts 
supporting charges of aircraft piracy have occurred on a single plane, in the 
interest of consistency, high seas piracy can also occur on one ship.160 
Even so, it is questionable whether the perfonnance of abortions on 
high seas may be considered an illegal act of violence under international 
law. Although Ireland perceives the act as the unlawful killing of the 
unborn, there is no widespread agreement that abortion is a sufficiently 
heinous offense that justifies subjecting foreign vessels to jurisdiction by 
any state. 
In addition, the definition of piracy requires that the acts be committed 
for private ends. Here, Dr. Gomperts' mission is more an act of political 
resistance rather than private gain. She intends to perfonn abortions for 
free or for a nominal fee, therefore it is difficult to argue that there is an 
economic incentive at work. Instead, Dr. Gomperts has approached 
abortion as an international human rights issue and intends to highlight the 
restrictive abortion laws in Ireland and provide women with a choice. 161 
Although the abortion ship does not fall within universal jurisdiction 
under the LOSe, customary principles of international law may provide a 
basis for extra-territorial jurisdiction. Ireland could certainly assert 
jurisdiction over Irish passengers on board the abortion ship under the 
nationality principle and over the Dutch nationals under the passive 
personality principle since they would be considered perpetrators of a 
crime against the Irish unborn .. 
However, although extra-territorial jurisdiction IS theoretically 
159. Id. at art. 101. 
160. Elissa Steglich, Hiding in the Hulls: Attacking the Practice of High Seas Murder of 
Stowaways Through Expanded Criminal Jurisdiction, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1323, 1340-41 
(2000). 
161. Corbett, supra note 39, at 24. 
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plausible, it is questionable whether Ireland would assert jurisdiction 
because of the right to travel to member states of the European Union for 
an abortion. The Netherlands is a member of the European Union, and 
therefore an Irish woman may travel to the Netherlands to procure an 
abortion without fear of prosecution. In this case, since Dr. Gomperts is 
using a Dutch-registered ship that is subject to Dutch sovereignty on the 
high seas, the Irish women have theoretically traveled to another European 
Union state. Ireland may argue that the Thirteenth Amendment only 
contemplated travel to the territorial land of another state. Yet, considering 
Ireland's traditional respect for the freedom of navigation on the high seas 
and recognition of flag state jurisdiction on the high seas, it would be very 
difficult for Ireland to make a convincing argument that the women have 
not effectively traveled outside the jurisdiction of Ireland. Therefore, 
although jurisdiction is relatively easy to obtain on nationality grounds, the 
women most likely would evade prosecution on substantive grounds. 
In addition, Ireland may argue that the Dutch nationals are within 
extra-territorial jurisdiction under the passive personality principle, which 
justifies jurisdiction over perpetrators of crimes against Irish nationals. 
Since the Irish Constitution recognizes the right to life of the unborn and 
abortion is a criminal offense, Ireland could argue that the State has an 
interest in protecting the life of its nationals and bringing those who 
jeopardize that life to justice. Yet Ireland will have difficulty asserting this 
argument because abortion is not a crime within the Netherlands and the 
law of the flag state normally applies on foreign vessels on the high seas. 
Another potential theory that would justify extra-territorial jurisdiction 
is the protective principle. In order for jurisdiction to be justified under the 
protective principle, the offense must have harmful or possibly harmful 
effects to the national interests of the state claiming jurisdiction. 162 The 
protective theory was designed so that states may protect themselves from 
offenses that damage or threaten state security, sovereignty, treasury, or 
governmental functions. 163 
Ireland could argue that the performance of abortions in international 
seas threatens its moral sovereignty to determine what conduct is deemed 
offensive. Although Ireland is the only member of the European Union 
that has remained resistant to the legalization of abortion, European Union 
law typically defers to members states on issues of morality under the 
margin of appreciation doctrine of the European Convention of Human 
Rights. 164 Ireland may argue that although the abortions are performed 
162. Christopher L. Blakesley, Criminal Law: United States Jurisdiction Over 
Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1134-35 (1982). 
163. ld. at 1137-38. 
164. Angela Thompson, International Protection o/Women 's Rights~' An Analysis o/Open 
Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre v. Ireland, 12 B.U. INT'L LJ. 371, 
396-97 (1994). 
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outside Irish territory, the potential effects of an abortion ship in the 
aggregate would make Irish law meaningless if virtually any pregnant 
woman could tenninate her pregnancy outside the twelve-mile territorial 
limit. 
Although abortions perfonned on the high seas do not pose a security 
risk to Ireland, the acts do threaten to impose on Ireland's capability to 
regulate the conduct and morality of its own citizens. However, this 
argument interferes with the primary goal of international law of the sea, 
which is to maintain freedom of navigation and prevent ambiguity and 
subjective decision-making regarding jurisdictional authority. If states 
were allowed to assert extra-territorial jurisdiction based on morality 
arguments, the floodgates would open to all sorts of jurisdictional claims. 
Ireland may also refer to Article 300 of the LOSC which provides that, 
"State Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this 
Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms 
recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an 
abuse of right.,,165 The language of this provision indicates that the LOSC 
mandates that states exercise their rights without abusing the freedoms 
guaranteed. Arguably, Ireland and other states would view this activity as 
an abuse of high seas freedoms to undennine Irish sovereignty. Since 
perfonning abortions is not within the contemplated purposes for ensuring 
freedom of the high seas, such as ease of navigation and sharing of fishing 
resources, the Dutch nationals' conduct may be perceived as a 
manipulation of international law and an improper attempt to politicize on 
an international level a traditionally domestic issue. 
On the other hand, pro-choice advocates would argue that such conduct 
vindicates women's right to reproductive choice and fights against what 
many activists perceive to be a violation of international human rights by 
denying access to abortion services to those women who cannot afford to 
travel abroad. Perhaps an abuse of the law of the sea is a lesser evil than 
turning a blind eye to the needs of thousands of Irish women. 
Most likely, the parties to the LOSC did not consider how to resolve 
situations where the nature of the conduct implicates morality rather than 
security, environmental, or resource interests. Since the parties to the 
Convention are unlikely to reconvene in the near future to consider whether 
such uses of the high seas should be pennissible, the question remains 
unanswered until Dr. Gomperts or another human rights activist 
successfully tests the limits of international law. In that event, Ireland may 
invoke a dispute resolution mechanism under the LOSC. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Since Dr. Gomperts was unable to fulfill all of the goals of her mission 
165. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 73, at art. 300 (emphasis added). 
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and perform abortions on the high seas, it remains to be seen to what extent 
a state may protect itself from challenges to its moral independence and 
how the international community would respond to such use of the high 
seas. As the trend toward the liberalization of abortion law continues and 
the world becomes increasingly inter-dependent, Ireland is under increasing 
pressure to harmonize its laws with the rest of Europe. Although there are 
potential arguments that Ireland may raise in asserting jurisdiction under 
the LOSe and customary law, the Irish government may be placed in a 
difficult position of choosing between maintaining freedom of navigation 
or protecting its own societal interest in preserving the protection of the 
Irish unborn. 
The abortion ship provides a powerful example of how activists can 
successfully circumvent domestic law by crossing international boundaries. 
Interestingly, the high seas may provide a new battleground for debate in 
the twenty-first century as Dr. Gomperts' idea has attracted the attention of 
Australian doctor Philip Nitschke, who plans to buy a Dutch-registered ship 
in order to set up a euthanasia clinic that would travel to countries where 
the practice is illeg~l.'66 
Although the abortion ship may not be a definitive solution to the 
restriction on women's right to choose in Ireland, it may be a temporary 
answer for the potentially large number of women who cannot afford to 
travel to states where abortion is legal. Perhaps even more significantly, 
such action raises awareness and forces the abortion issue to the forefront 
of the international community. 
166. David Betty, Doctor Plans Euthanasia Boat in u.K. Waters, THE GUARDIAN, June 19, 
2001, at 9. 

